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
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

The over-all objective in South Viet-Nam is to win the war against the Viet Cong. The subsidiary objective is to bring about such changes in the policies and composition of the Vietnamese Government as to ensure sufficient popular support to accomplish the over-all objective successfully.

It is our judgment that the elite in the cities are now disaffected with the regime and that, since it is this elite that supplies both the military and civil officers on whom the war effort depends, the disaffection will slowly but inevitably affect the war effort. It is Ambassador Lodge's judgment, which we share, that the situation is worsening rapidly--posing the risk of a crisis of desperation in which more and more Vietnamese see their choices as civil war against the government or a sauf qui peut flight to the Viet Cong of individuals and even whole units, as happened in China. Thus, our judgment is also that there is a time urgency.

To restore confidence a change is needed in both policies and personnel. What has happened, however, is that personnel--the Nhus--have become a symbol of policy. The Nhus stand for both the GVN policy of repression and also for US support for the regime and thus for its policies. The Nhus must therefore go. Although our demand for tactical purposes can be couched in terms

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of a six months' vacation abroad, they must, in fact, be barred from return until the war is won.

Concurrent with the departure of the Nhus, the GVN should dramatically reverse its policies of repression, i.e., martial law should be lifted and press censorship removed; all those arrested as a result of recent events should be released; a joint statement of reconciliation should be negotiated with the Buddhists, etc.

The Government should then be reorganized and broadened to include respected individuals such as Tran Quoc Buu and Pham Huy Quat, with one or two ministerial posts given to such senior generals as Duong Van Minh (Big Minh) and Le Van Kim, and with the recall to public service of one or two individuals who have left Viet-Nam but have not been associated with exile politics, such as Vu Van Mau and Vu Van Thai.

It should be recognized that, even though it is not our intention to remove Diem, the Ngo family may resist the removal of the Nhus and a reversal of policies as to make Diem's removal inevitable. If so, our goal should be so to structure the situation that Diem has the options of staying without his brother or retiring to a monastery of his own free will. (At this stage, Diem still retains the loyalty of many of the military and the peasants who would resent his forcible ouster, at least at this stage, but would completely understand his choosing family rather than country.)